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There is an old question: does a judge decide how a case will
come out, and then find a justification in the law? Or does the judge
approach the case with no strong prior inclination and follow the legal
materials where they lead? If we confine the question to judges who
are reasonably able and conscientious, the answer is surely that cases
lie on a continuum between these poles. In some cases judges may
have no strong intuitions, and they more or less try to figure out the
right answer from the legal materials, perhaps approaching them with
a weak and rebuttable prior view that one position is correct. One
would expect that to be true in cases involving relatively technical
bodies of law that engage no strong moral sentiments, or perhaps in
areas that are so infrequently litigated that the law is unfamiliar.
In other cases one would expect a judge to have strong intuitions,
from the start, about how the case should come out. There is nothing
necessarily wrong with this, at least as long as the judge is willing to
change her mind if the legal materials, upon investigation, make it
clear that the intuition is unsustainable. It is sensible, as well as inevi-
table, for people immersed in the legal culture to trust their intuitions
about what the law must be before they have specifically investigated
an issue.
The extraordinary litigation that led to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Bush v Gore' allows us to speculate, with more confidence than
usual, about how the justices approached the issues presented by that
case. The fast pace of the proceedings, and the relative novelty of the
legal issues, made the justices' thought processes unusually visible.
They could not, as they ordinarily would, wait for the lower court pro-
ceedings to be fully completed and take as much time as they needed
before committing themselves publicly to a position. They had to re-
spond to two separate decisions of the Florida Supreme Court very
quickly and very publicly.
The conclusion that emerges, in my view, is that several members
of the Court-perhaps a majority-were determined to overturn any
ruling of the Florida Supreme Court that was favorable to Vice Presi-
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dent Gore, at least if that ruling significantly enhanced the Vice Presi-
dent's chances of winning the election. They acted on the basis of
strong intuitions-which, as I said, is by no means necessarily inap-
propriate in itself-but the intuitions were intuitions about the out-
come, not about the law. The specific legal questions presented in the
litigation were shifting, complex, and esoteric. It is hard to see how the
justices could have strong legal intuitions about any of those specific
questions. To the extent those questions raised familiar broad issues-
like federalism and the relationship between the courts and the politi-
cal process -the majority's reaction in this litigation contradicted their
normal inclinations. During the litigation, the justices in the majority
appear to have accepted, at one time or another, four different argu-
ments offered by Governor Bush's lawyers, all of which were ques-
tionable-one of which, based on 3 USC § 5,2 even the majority sub-
sequently abandoned-but which had one common element: they re-
quired that the Florida Supreme Court be reversed. On the crucial
remedial question that ensured Governor Bush's election, the major-
ity's decision appears to be simply indefensible. And the majority
opinion insisted that its rationale was to be applied, essentially, only in
this case-basically conceding that the result, not the legal principle,
dictated the outcome.
What explains this extraordinary behavior by the Supreme
Court? The most plausible hypothesis, I believe, is that several mem-
bers of the United States Supreme Court were convinced that the
Florida Supreme Court would try to give the election to Vice Presi-
dent Gore and would act improperly if necessary to accomplish that
objective. The governing intuition was that the Florida Supreme Court
had to be stopped from doing this. The majority's actions in the litiga-
tion show a relentless search for some reason that could be put for-
ward to justify a decision reversing the Florida Supreme Court. The
outcome was a foregone conclusion.
If this is correct, then the United States Supreme Court's decision
was not even on the continuum I described above. It was not compa-
rable, for example, to judges' having an intuition that school segrega-
tion is unconstitutional, then groping for a theory that would justify
that conclusion. School segregation was a familiar thing, as were the
basic principles of the Equal Protection Clause. It is hard to believe
that anyone on the Supreme Court really had strong intuitions about
(or even more than a bare familiarity with) the provisions of Article II
of the Constitution, or Title 3 of the United States Code, that played
2 3 USC § 5 (1994). See text accompanying notes 9-10.
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such a large role in the Bush v Gore litigation. The Equal Protection
Clause was the ultimate basis for the decision, but the majority essen-
tially admitted (what was obvious in any event) that it was not basing
its conclusion on any general view of what equal protection requires.
The decision in Bush v Gore was not dictated by the law in any
sense-either the law found through research, or the law as reflected
in the kind of intuitive sense that comes from immersion in the legal
culture.
In the rest of this Essay, I will try to support this speculation. Per-
haps the most obvious way to support it would be to demonstrate that
the Court's decision was wrong on the merits. But that case has been
made, not least by the dissenting opinions.' Besides, it is no sin for a
court to get a case wrong, especially if the issues are complex and the
time is brutally short. Other aspects of the litigation are, I believe,
more revealing about how the justices approached this case, and I will
examine them in Part I below.
Then in Part II, I will consider whether the majority, irrespective
of whether it was following the law, was actually right about the Flor-
ida Supreme Court-and if so, whether the United States Supreme
Court's decision might be, in some sense, justifiable. The argument in
defense of the United States Supreme Court would have to be that it
engaged in a kind of morally justified civil disobedience. It deliber-
ately acted in a way that could not be legally justified in order to pre-
vent some greater harm. I do not think that argument can be sus-
tained. But it would be enough of a breakthrough if it were generally
accepted that the United States Supreme Court's decision has to be
justified, if at all, in those terms.
I. FIVE REVEALING AcTs
A. The Remedy
Seven justices concluded that the recount ordered by the Florida
Supreme Court in the contest proceedings violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. A majority of the Court reasoned that the procedures un-
der which the Florida Supreme Court proposed to conduct the re-
count "do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-arbitrary
treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental right" to
vote.' Among other things, the majority said, the "intent of the voter"
standard that the Florida court used, while "unobjectionable as an ab-
3 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 539 (Stevens dissenting); id at 542 (Souter dissenting); id at 546
(Ginsburg dissenting); id at 550 (Breyer dissenting).
4 Id at 530.
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stract proposition and a starting principle," requires "specific stan-
dards to ensure its equal application.5 "The formulation of uniform
rules to determine intent based on these recurring circumstances is
practicable and, we conclude, necessary.,
6
On the merits, this holding is very adventuresome-it goes well
beyond anything the Court had previously said-but it is not wholly
implausible. It would not have been shocking if the Warren Court had
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause in this way (although there
would no doubt have been much criticism of it for doing so). In fact,
this interpretation can be seen both as an extension of the Warren
Court's vision of democracy and as a logical implication of the view,
seriously proposed a generation ago, that the Constitution limits the
degree to which discretion can be vested in executive officials of both
the state and federal governments.7 For the majority of this Court, the
equal protection holding was wildly out of character. And it seems
very questionable for the Court to announce and apply a novel princi-
ple like this for the first time in a case that effectively decides a presi-
dential election. But on the underlying merits, the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause was not indefensible.
What does seem indefensible is the Court's remedy. Of the seven
justices who concluded that the recount procedures ordered by the
Florida Supreme Court violated the Equal Protection Clause, two
would have followed what seems like the normal course: a remand to
allow the Florida Supreme Court to dispose of the case in a way that
was consistent with both the United States Supreme Court's ruling
and Florida law. But by a vote of five to four, the Court refused to al-
low the Florida Supreme Court to try to implement its ruling on re-
mand. The majority stated that complying with the Court's ruling
would require "substantial additional work."' It then reasoned as fol-
lows:
The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature in-
tended the State's electors to "participat[e] fully in the federal
electoral process," as provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5[, which] requires
that any controversy or contest that is designed to lead to a con-
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice:A Preliminary Inquiry (LSU 1969); James
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv L Rev 1521, 1521-22 (1981). A few
court of appeals cases seemed to adopt this approach, but they were generally not followed. See,
for example, Holmes v New York City Housing Authority, 398 F2d 262 (2d Cir 1968); Hornsby v
Allen, 326 F2d 605 (5th Cir 1964).
8 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 532.
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clusive selection of electors be completed by December 12. That
date is upon us, and there is no recount procedure in place under
the State Supreme Court's order that comports with minimal
constitutional standards .... Because the Florida Supreme Court
has said that the Florida Legislature intended to obtain the safe-
harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5, Justice BREYER's proposed
remedy-remanding to the Florida Supreme Court for its order-
ing of a constitutionally proper contest until December 18-
contemplates action in violation of the Florida election code, and
hence could not be part of an "appropriate" order authorized by
[Florida law].'
The federal statute to which the Court referred-3 USC § 5, the so-
called safe harbor provision-provides that when a state has made a
"final determination of any controversy" concerning the appointment
of electors "at least six days before" the date the electors meet in the
state capital to vote, "such determination ... shall be conclusive" on
Congress.' By law the electors met on December 18,2000, so Decem-
ber 12 was the cutoff for taking advantage of the safe harbor.
What the majority did in this passage was to attribute to the Flor-
ida legislature not just an intention to adhere to Section 5, but an in-
tention to adhere to Section 5 at any cost. The majority said, in effect,
that the Florida state legislature would want to take advantage of Sec-
tion 5 even if that meant awarding the state's electoral votes to the
candidate who lost the election-"lost" according to the state's elec-
tion laws, as interpreted by the state's highest court and modified by
any federal constitutional requirements. That is an unlikely intention
for any legislature to have. Certainly one would expect that the legis-
lature would rather send forward challengeable electoral votes for the
winner of the state's popular vote, rather than unchallengeable votes
for the loser. To attribute a contrary intention to Florida on the basis
of a general statement in the Florida Supreme Court's opinion" is very
strained. In fact, the Florida Supreme Court's opinion suggests, if any-
thing, that it would not have wanted to abandon the effort to count
votes; the majority of that court explicitly rejected the argument, ad-
vanced in a dissenting opinion, that "because of looming deadlines
and practical difficulties we should give up any attempt to have the
9 Id at 532-33.
10 3 USC § 5.
11 See Gore v Harris, 772 S2d 1243,1261 (Fa Dec 8, 2000), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore,
121 S Ct 525.
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election of the presidential electors rest upon the vote of Florida citi-
zens as mandated by the Legislature."' 2
At the very least, it was uncertain what the Florida Supreme
Court would have said if forced to choose between the safe harbor
and continued counting. In the face of any uncertainty about the Flor-
ida legislature's intentions, for the United States Supreme Court to at-
tribute such an unlikely intention to the Florida legislature without
even remanding, to see what the Florida Supreme Court would say, is
inexplicable -unless, of course, the United States Supreme Court sim-
ply did not trust the Florida Supreme Court to play it straight.
B. The Stay
On December 9, the Court, by the same vote of 5-4 that would ul-
timately decide the case, issued a stay of the Florida Supreme Court's
second decision." The effect of the stay was to stop the counting of the
ballots ordered by the Florida Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's
standard rule for granting a stay of a lower court's order is that the
party seeking the stay must demonstrate a substantial probability of
success on the merits, and the "balance of equities"-the harm faced
by the petitioner if the stay is denied, compared to the harm to the re-
spondent if the stay is granted-must favor the petitioner."
By that measure, the stay seems impossible to justify. To begin
with, it is not clear that the harm to Governor Bush should have car-
ried any weight at all. Justice Scalia, in an opinion defending the stay,
explained that "[t]he counting of votes that are of questionable legal-
ity . . . threaten[s] irreparable harm to [Governor Bush], and to the
country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of
his election."" The premise of this argument is that there is a legiti-
mate interest in suppressing truthful information -information about
what the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court would have
disclosed-in order to protect the President of the United States from
political harm. Ordinarily it is a fundamental principle of our system
of freedom of expression that the government cannot limit what peo-
ple hear about politics because it mistrusts their ability to evaluate
that information rationally. The majority's apparent conclusion that
12 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d 1220,1261-62 n 21 (Fla Nov 21,
2000), vacd and remd as, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per
curiam).
13 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 512 (2000) (application for stay).
14 See, for example, Rubin v United States, 524 US 1301, 1301 (1998) (discussing the condi-
tions under which stays should be granted).
15 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 512 (Scalia concurring).
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then-Governor Bush had a legitimate interest in suppressing certain
information may not be wholly unsupportable, but it is at least prob-
lematic.
But if one accepts the possible political damage to Governor
Bush as a legitimate harm, the potential harm to Vice President Gore
was vastly greater. Had Vice President Gore prevailed on the merits in
the Supreme Court, the stay might easily have deprived him of his vic-
tory, by preventing the counting of the ballots before the electors were
to cast their votes on December 18. It is true that the failure to grant a
stay might have inflicted political damage on a Bush presidency; but
granting a stay might have wholly deprived Vice President Gore of the
presidency.
There is only one circumstance in which the balance of equities
might have favored Governor Bush: if a majority of the Supreme
Court had already decided how it was going to rule. If there had been
any chance that the Vice President would win in the Supreme Court,
the stay was indefensible. But if it were a foregone conclusion that the
Florida Supreme Court's decision would be reversed, even the admin-
istrative expense of counting might justify a stay. In addition, if five
justices had already made up their minds that they were going to rule
in favor of Governor Bush, the stay, however controversial, ensured
that they would not be in the awkward position of reversing an appar-
ent Gore victory. The hypothesis that best explains the majority's deci-
sion to grant a stay despite the imbalance in the equities and the ques-
tionable nature of Governor Bush's interest is that the majority knew,
when it granted the stay, how the case would come out.
That, too, is not necessarily a reason to criticize the justices. It is
probably pretty common for justices to know, from reading the certio-
rari petition, how they will vote in a case. But this was not a run of the
mill case presenting a slight variant on a subject that the justices have
thought about dozens of times. The Florida Supreme Court's decision
in Bush v Gore concerned a state election law statute with which the
justices surely had no prior familiarity-even from Bush v Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board,16 which concerned an entirely different
state statute. Governor Bush's arguments also drew on broader as-
pects of Florida election law and Florida administrative law; he ar-
gued, for example, that the Florida Supreme Court should have re-
quired deference to the decisions of the county canvassing boards
even though the contest statute did not say that explicitly. The equal
protection argument that was the basis of the majority's opinion de-
16 121 S Ct 471 (2000) (per curiam).
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pended on a detailed familiarity with the facts about the various re-
counts that had been underway, as well as an assessment of what was
"practicable.""
The Florida Supreme Court issued the opinion at 4:00 p.m. on
December 8. The United States Supreme Court granted the stay at
2:45 p.m. on December 9." In less than twenty-three hours, five justices
evidently had decided that Governor Bush was sure to prevail, be-
cause in view of the harm to the Vice President, the stay could not
possibly be justified if there had been any doubt. The justices reached
this decision even though they had little or no prior familiarity with
the state law involved, and even though they were acting on the basis
of a very hastily prepared stay application and opposition. It is hard to
resist the conclusion that they knew all along what they were going to
do.
C. The Grant of Certiorari in Bush v Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board
Governor Bush's certiorari petition in Bush v Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board relied primarily, and very heavily, on 3 USC § 5.
Section 5 was the basis of the first question presented in the petition,
and the twenty-seven page petition did not begin to discuss any other
arguments until page eighteen.20 This is a pretty clear indication that
Governor Bush's lawyers thought Section 5 provided their best argu-
ment by far. That argument-repeatedly asserted in the petition-was
that Section 5 forbade Florida from altering its election laws after the
date of the election.2' This passage-the mphasis is in the original-is
representative:
The application of 3 U.S.C. § 5 in these circumstances is straight-
forward.... [T]his Court has not previously been called upon to
decide whether or not the States must adhere to preexisting law
in resolving election disputes. But the plain language of the fed-
eral statute indicates that they must do so. 2
17 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 530.
18 Gore v Harris, 772 S2d 1243 (Fla Dec 8,2000), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct
525.
19 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct 512.
20 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, No 00-836,
*27 (filed Nov 22,2000) (available on Lexis at 2000 US Briefs 836).
21 Idat*12.
22 Id at *18. For similar statements, see, for example, id at *17-22; id at *12 (stating that
"[t]he evident purpose of this federal law is to ensure that the applicable rules cannot be
changed once the voters have gone to the polls"); id at *13 (noting "the express federal statutory
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This interpretation of Section 5 is wrong. No one, now, believes
otherwise. Section 5 does not prohibit states from "changing the
rules"; it just provides that the consequence of doing so is that their
choice of electors may be challenged before Congress. This is in fact
clear from the language of the statute, once one untangles its syntax,
and by the time Bush v Gore was decided even the three justices who
concluded that the Florida Supreme Court had changed the law did
not assert that that court's action was forbidden by Section 5.
Governor Bush's lawyers really cannot be faulted for writing the
petition as they did. They were scrambling, under enormous time pres-
sure, to find some basis to get the Supreme Court involved in what
was really a dispute over the meaning of state law, and like almost
everyone else they did not have prior familiarity with the esoteric
provisions of Title 3. In fact, Vice President Gore's brief in opposition
to the petition did not recognize the plain error in the interpretation
of Section 5." In his brief on the merits, Vice President Gore did dem-
onstrate that Section 5 was only a safe harbor;4 in fact, by the time
Governor Bush's lawyers wrote their brief on the merits, they had re-
alized, too, that they had gone too far, and their Section 5 arguments
in the merits brief were much more hedged."
But if one cannot fault the lawyers, one can certainly raise con-
cerns about the actions of the Supreme Court, which made a very
questionable decision to intervene in the litigation on the basis of a
misunderstanding of the law-and an even more questionable deci-
sion not to back out when its misunderstanding became clear. The
Court granted certiorari on the question presenting the Section 5 is-
sue. (It also agreed to review a question raising an Article II issue, but
it did not grant certiorari on the question in the Bush petitions that
raised the Equal Protection Clause issue.") The Court then instructed
the parties to address the question: "What would be the consequences
of this Court's finding that the decision of the Supreme Court of Flor-
prohibition against the post hoc creation of new legal rules"); id at *15-16 ("Congress's federally
imposed requirement hat controversy over the appointment of electors be resolved solely under
legal standards 'enacted prior to' the date of the election.").
23 See Brief in Opposition to Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, Bush v Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board, No 00-836, *6 (filed Nov 24,2000) (available on Lexis at 2000 US Briefs 836).
24 See Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr., and Florida Democratic Party, Bush v Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board, No 00-836, *1 (filed Nov 28, 2000) (available on Lexis at 2000
US Briefs 836).
25 See Brief for Petitioner, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, No 00-836, *12-
13 (filed Nov 28,2000) (available on Lexis at 2000 US Briefs 836).
26 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board at *i
(cited in note 20) (available on Lexis at 2000 US Briefs 836); Bush v Palm Beach County Can-
vassing Board, 121 S Ct 510 (2000) (granting writ of certiorari).
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ida does not comply with 3 U.S.C. Section 5? '7 This question reflects a
misunderstanding of Section 5; if the Court had understood that Sec-
tion 5 was most plausibly understood only to create a safe harbor, it
would have asked the parties to address directly the question whether
Section 5 did more than that. The Court's actions also suggested that
the Court believed the Section 5 issue would be the central issue in
the case.
The Court's decision to grant certiorari was very surprising to
most observers, and it was a highly significant event. Among other
things, it gave credibility to the extremely harsh attacks that Governor
Bush's representatives made on the Florida Supreme Court. There
was no obvious legal reason for the Court to intervene; that is why its
decision to do so surprised most observers. The central issues were
ones of state law and, as their treatment of Section 5 shows, even
Governor Bush's lawyers, with every incentive to find a federal ques-
tion in the case, struggled to do so.
In these circumstances -a highly charged political context raising
difficult issues of state law and no obvious issues of federal law-the
Supreme Court would ordinarily operate with a strong presumption
against granting certiorari. That is what it should have done in this
case. Its attitude should have been that unless it found a compelling
argument that the Florida Supreme Court violated federal law, it
would stay out of the case. It did not find such an argument; if it had, it
would not have focused the parties' attention on an argument that
turned out to be plainly wrong. To put the point another way, before it
made a grant of certiorari that was momentous in itself, the Supreme
Court should have examined the Section 5 argument carefully enough
to discover the error that soon became clear to everyone. The fact that
it didn't is another indication that the Court was reacting viscerally on
the basis of an inchoate sense, not grounded in any legal principle, that
something had to be done.
D. The Ruling in Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board
The Court's decision in Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board bears out the impression that a majority of the justices, having
made up their minds that the Florida Supreme Court's decision should
not be allowed to stand, was seeking only a suitable means of over-
turning it. By the time of the oral argument, no justice was receptive
to the interpretation of Section 5 that had been put forward in the pe-
tition. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, however, raised, at
27 Bush v Palm Beach Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct at 510.
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argument, the question whether the Florida Supreme Court had vio-
lated Article II, Section 1 by relying on the state constitution in inter-
preting state voting laws.8 The Court subsequently issued a unanimous
opinion vacating the decision of the Florida Supreme Court and re-
manding the case to that court, principally to determine if the Florida
Supreme Court had relied on the Florida Constitution. The Supreme
Court explained its remand by saying that "[t]here are expressions in
the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida that may be read to indi-
cate that it construed the Florida Election Code without regard to the
extent to which the Florida Constitution could, consistent with Art. II,
§ 1, cl. 2, 'circumscribe the legislative power."29
This decision was praised as statesmanlike by some, and it did
temporarily paper over the sharp disagreements among the justices
that surfaced at he argument. But in other respects the decision was
anything but a careful and prudent use of the Supreme Court's power.
It is, for example, entirely clear that the Court did not grant cer-
tiorari in order to address the issue on which it remanded. Not only
was the Court focused on 3 USC § 5 when it granted certiorari, but-
more significantly- the petition did not at any point argue that the
Florida Supreme Court violated Article II by relying on the provisions
of the Florida Constitution.V That argument, which later persuaded
the Court, did not merit as much as a single sentence in the certiorari
petition. If the Court had granted the petition in order to consider this
question, it would have directed the parties to address it specifically, as
it directed the parties to address a question that it mistakenly thought
was raised by 3 USC § 5.
When the Court realized that it had agreed to review the case on
the basis of a misunderstanding of the law (that is, of 3 USC § 5), it
might have done one of several things. It might have dismissed the
writ as improvidently granted. If that were too embarrassing, the
Court might have found some other ground to dismiss the writ; for ex-
ample, by the time of the Court's decision, the case was at least close
enough to being moot to justify dismissing the petition. Conceivably,
once it decided that the important issue was one that both it and the
parties had all but ignored, it could have asked for briefing on that is-
sue. But the Court did none of those things. Instead, it appears to have
28 Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, No 00-836,
*50-51 (Dec 1, 2000) (available on Lexis at 2000 US Trans Lexis 70).
29 Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct at 474, quoting McPherson v
Blacker, 146 US 1, 25 (1892).
30 The issue was comprised within one of the questions presented in the petition and there-
fore was technically before the Court, but it was not argued in the petition in any form.
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issued as severe a rebuke to the Florida Supreme Court as it could,
while still maintaining unanimity.
There were several things wrong with this course of action. First,
the constitutional question is in fact a complex one. It is far from clear
what the relationship is between a state's constitution and the power
that a state "legislature" may exercise under Article II, Section 1 to
"direct" the "manner" in which electors are appointed. Presumably a
state constitution may not itself direct how electors are chosen, at
least if the constitution is not the work of the legislature.' But the
other polar position -that a legislature may wholly disregard the state
constitution when it directs how electors are appointed-cannot pos-
sibly be correct. A state legislature is a creature of the state constitu-
tion: You cannot tell the difference between a state's real legislature
and a group of usurpers without looking at the state constitution. Be-
yond that, state constitutions often specify such things as when the
legislature meets, how it is convened and adjourned, what constitutes
a quorum, and so on.2 It would be very surprising if a state legislature
could simply ignore such state constitutional provisions when it was
directing the manner in which presidential electors are appointed. De-
termining the ways in which a state constitution may and may not
limit the legislature's decisions about presidential electors will, there-
fore, be a difficult and complex task.
Second, as the Court must have been aware, its decision was gen-
erally viewed as resolving-not just raising-the question whether Ar-
ticle II, Section 1 precludes state constitutional limits on legislative ac-
tion. The Court did not even acknowledge that some state constitu-
tional limits on legislative power would be unproblematic, much less
explain where the line might be drawn between acceptable and unac-
ceptable limits. The Court's formulation of the reason for vacating the
Florida Supreme Court's decision-"we are unclear as to the extent to
which the Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as cir-
cumscribing the legislature's authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2"3 -was
quite naturally taken to mean that any such "circumscription" might
be unconstitutional. Thus the effect of the Supreme Court's remand
31 Vice President Gore's lawyers argued that the Florida Constitution is in fact the work of
the legislature, thus making the issue even more complex and the Court's conclusion even more
questionable. See Brief For Respondents Al Gore, Jr., and Florida Democratic Party, Bush v
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, No 00-836, *42-43 (filed Nov 28, 2000) (available on
Lexis at 2000 US Briefs 836).
32 See, for example, Fla Const Art III, § 3, cl a-c (specifying when the legislature meets); id
cl c, e (specifying how the legislature is convened and adjourned); id § 4, cl a (specifying what
constitutes a quorum).
33 Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct at 475.
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was not only to suggest that the Florida Supreme Court had acted un-
constitutionally but to affect the further proceedings in that court.
Finally, the decision of the Florida Supreme Court by no means
forced the United States Supreme Court to confront this question. The
Florida Supreme Court did not declare that something the legislature
had done was unconstitutional under the state constitution. At worst,
the Florida Supreme Court relied on the state constitution for general
principles of a kind that could easily be seen as part of the background
against which the legislature knowingly enacted the Florida election
laws-which is how the Florida Supreme Court explained its opinion
on remand. Significantly, Governor Bush did not press this argument
at any point in the litigation until it was raised by members of the
Court. The argument was, as I said, not mentioned at all in the peti-
tion; it was made perfunctorily in Governor Bush's merits brief (in
only three paragraphs, on page forty-seven of a fifty page brief); and it
was not mentioned at oral argument until members of the Court
brought it up.
In other words, the Court-having evidently granted certiorari
under a misapprehension about 3 USC § 5-issued a politically sensi-
tive decision that was bound to be misinterpreted on a complex ques-
tion that was not squarely raised, not adequately briefed, and not ag-
gressively pushed by the petitioner. Why did the Court do this? In
theory, because it was possible (although very unlikely) that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court would acknowledge that its decision relied on the
state constitution to reject a legislative directive, and because it was
possible (although again unlikely) that such a decision, on the basis of
the kind of general principles discussed in the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion, might transgress constitutional limits that the United
States Supreme Court did not seriously try to define. As an exercise of
the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction, this is irregular to the
point of being inexplicable. As an effort to thwart, by any means nec-
essary, a perceived illegitimate act by the Florida Supreme Court, it
begins to make sense.
E. The Equal Protection Holding, Limited "to this Case"
The Court's own statements provide the final piece of evidence
that the Court was responding not to any legal principle but to a per-
ception that something needed to be done in this particular case. Bush
v Gore held that the recount procedures mandated by the Florida Su-
preme Court "do not satisfy the minimum requirement for non-
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arbitrary treatment of voters." The Court identified a number of as-
pects of the ruling that seemed arbitrary to it-for example, that the
lower court included in the vote totals partial recounts from some
counties, and manually recounted overvotes from some jurisdictions
but not others.35 But those problems could have been cured by direct-
ing the Florida Supreme Court to modify the vote totals; they did not
justify the United States Supreme Court in holding that the recount
could not go forward.
That aspect of the Court's holding, which may have determined
the outcome of the presidential election, was justified on the basis of a
plausible but potentially far-reaching principle: that at least where the
right to vote is concerned, the states may not use discretionary stan-
dards if it is practicable to formulate rules that will limit discretion. In
particular, the Court concluded that the standard that the Florida Su-
preme Court specified to govern the counting of votes-that the in-
tention of the voter be honored-is "unobjectionable as an abstract
proposition" but requires "specific standards to ensure its equal appli-
cation." The Court acknowledged, of course, that discretionary in-
quiries into intent are common in many areas of the law. But it said
that here, "[t]he search for intent can be confined by specific rules de-
signed to ensure equal treatment.""
This is a recognizable principle: a state must make decisions ac-
cording to rules, rather than according to discretionary standards, at
least when the costs of doing so are not too great. The Court's decision
to limit this principle to voting -rather than to allow it to be extended
to, for example, the criminal justice system, where it might have dra-
matic effects-is at least supported by precedent, which can be read to
treat voting rights differently from most other individual interests.M
Even as applied to voting rights, this principle would have far-reaching
implications given the ubiquity of the "intent of the voter" standard39
and the wide local variations in voting and tabulation mechanisms and
34 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 530.
35 Id at 531-32.
36 Id at 530.
37 Id.
38 See, for example, Kramer v Union Free School District No 15, 395 US 621, 626 (1969)
(holding that the right to vote lies at "the foundation of our representative society" and classifi-
cations with regard to that right to vote are subject to strict scrutiny); Harper v Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 US 663, 665 (1966) ("[T]he right to suffrage is subject to the imposition of state
standards which are not discriminatory.").
39 See Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 541 (Stevens dissenting); Brief of Respondent Albert Gore,
Jr, Bush v Gore, No 00-949, *36 (filed Dec 10, 2000) (available on Westlaw at 2000 WL 1809151).
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the like. But the effects would probably not be more dramatic than,
say, those of the Court's reapportionment decisions of the 1960s.,°
The problem is that the Court was not interested in the principle.
It went out of its way to try to limit its ruling to the facts of Bush v
Gore. The Court said that it was ruling only on "the special instance of
a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial offi-
cer"4-without explaining why this was a special instance, different
from all other aspects of the electoral process. The Court then tried
even harder to limit its holding:
Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the
problem of equal protection in election processes generally pre-
sents many complexities. The question before the Court is not
whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may de-
velop different systems for implementing elections. Instead, we
are presented with a situation where a state court with the power
to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount. 2
There is no obvious reason - and the Court gave none - for using
a different rule when a state legislature "with the power to assure uni-
formity" is acting, or for why the recount itself does not present as
many "complexities" as other aspects of voting, or why "local entities,
in the exercise of their expertise" could not "develop different systems
for implementing" the voter intent standard.
The Court's attempt to limit its holding, with barely a fig leaf of
principle, gives the game away. The majority was not concerned with
principle. It smelled a rat in this case. It thought the Florida Supreme
Court was up to no good. It could not explain what the Florida Su-
preme Court was up to in terms that engaged general principles that it
was willing to embrace, but it was determined to intervene and stop
that court. If the actions of the United States Supreme Court are to be
defended, they must be defended in those terms.
II. WAS IT JUSTIFIED?
The most straightforward way to determine whether the Florida
Supreme Court was acting in such an illegitimate way as to warrant
the United States Supreme Court's intervention is, of course, to con-
sider the merits of the issues. The United States Supreme Court's rul-
ing on the equal protection issue, although potentially defensible in
40 See Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533,555 (1964); Wesberry v Sanders, 376 US 1 (1964).
41 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 532.
42 Id.
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principle, was certainly novel, and surely the Florida Supreme Court
did not act illegitimately when it failed to anticipate that ruling. Most
of the attacks on the Florida Supreme Court's decision instead seem
to assert-as the three-justice concurring opinion did in Bush v
Gore-that that court's interpretation of Florida election law was so
indefensible that it violated Article II, Section 1. The merits of this po-
sition have been extensively discussed, beginning in the opinions
themselves, and there seems little to add.
One point should be emphasized, however. The Florida Supreme
Court decision that was overturned in Bush v Gore was consistent
with the plain language of the principal statute involved-the Florida
statute governing contests of election certifications3 - and neither the
concurring opinion nor, as far as I am aware, anyone else, has seriously
contended otherwise. Richard A. Posner specifically addresses this ar-
gument in his contribution to this symposium, but his remarks betray
the weakness of his position." Judge Posner does not contend that the
Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the contest statute is incon-
sistent with its plain meaning. Judge Posner says that the term "error
in vote tabulation" has a plain meaning. That seems implausible to me,
but in any event that term occurs in the protest statute, not the contest
statute, and was not at issue in Bush v Gore.
In fact, Judge Posner's suggestion that I misunderstand the "'plain
meaning' interpretive principle" neatly reveals where the argument in
his Essay goes wrong. That principle bears on the question whether
the Florida Supreme Court correctly interpreted Florida law. But that
question was not before the United States Supreme Court. The posi-
tion of the three concurring Justices was a usurpation precisely be-
cause they- like Judge Posner- acted as if that were the question. The
question before the United States Supreme Court was whether what
the Florida court did was so far wrong that it violated Article II, Sec-
tion 1-and for purposes of that question, the fact (implicitly conceded
by Posner) that the Florida court's action was consistent with the plain
meaning of the contest statute is a strong point in the Florida court's
defense. That statute provides that "rejection of a number of legal
votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election"
is a "ground[ ] for contesting [the] election."5 The statute does not de-
fine what a "legal vote[ ]" is. The statute also includes an exceptionally
broad grant of power to the trial court: "The circuit judge to whom the
43 Fla Stat Ann § 102.168 (West 2000).
44 Richard A. Posner, Bush v Gore: Prolegomenon to an Assessment, 68 U Chi L Rev 719,
730 n 37 (2001).
45 Fla Stat Ann § 102.168(3),(3)(c).
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contest is presented may fashion such orders as he or she deems nec-
essary to ensure that each allegation in the complaint is investigated,
examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and to
provide any relief appropriate under such circumstances."6 It is not
eccentric, as a matter of English usage, to say that a "legal vote" has
been "reject[ed]" when a ballot is not counted in accordance with the
intentions that the voter indicates on it. The election in Florida was
close enough that those rejected votes "place[d] in doubt the result of
the election."7 And the procedures that the Florida Supreme Court
ordered were well within the broad remedial power granted by the
statute."
The fact that there is a plain language defense for the Florida Su-
preme Court's action does not establish that the Florida Supreme
Court's decision was correct-although the concurring opinion as-
serted that under Article I, Section 2, "the text of the election law it-
self.., takes on independent significance.49 But unless there is at least
a clearly settled line of precedent to the contrary-which there was
not in Florida; among other things, the contest statute had been exten-
sively revised in 1999-the fact that the Florida Supreme Court's deci-
sion was consistent with the plain language of the contest statute
should be enough to show that that court was not acting in a funda-
mentally illegitimate way that warranted the United States Supreme
Court's determined effort to derail it.
The concurring opinion's attack on the Florida Supreme Court
was that the Florida court interpreted the contest statute in a way that
fit badly with the provisions of Florida law that allow for a "protest"
before votes are certified.*° The relationship of the "protest" and the
"contest" statutes is an obvious concern; indeed, from the face of the
contest statute it looks as if a judge could intervene in almost any
46 Id § 102.168(8).
47 Id § 102.168(3)(c).
48 Those powers are granted to the trial judge, but in exigent circumstances, it is not ex-
traordinary for an appellate court to direct a lower court to exercise its discretion in a certain
way. The Florida Supreme Court did leave the trial court supervising the recount with substantial
discretion; that discretion was part of what led the majority to find an equal protection violation.
Neither the concurring opinion nor, so far as I am aware, anyone else, has shown that the Florida
legislature meant to prevent the Florida Supreme Court from exercising the normal range of ap-
pellate powers over the lower courts in this case.
49 Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 534. The full quotation is: "the text of the election law itself, and
not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on independent significance." It is not
clear why the concurring opinion said this. If a legislature acted with the understanding that
courts would interpret statutes in a way that did not follow "the text ... itself," then attaching
significance to the text, rather than judicial interpretations, would defeat the legislature's inten-
tions, presumably in contravention of Article I, Section 2.
50 See Fla Stat Ann § 102.166 (West 2000); Bush v Gore, 121 S Ct at 536-37.
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close election. The Florida Supreme Court tried to come to grips with
this problem, holding, for example, that the decisions of the canvassing
boards at the protest stage would be evidence admissible in the con-
test proceedings.' This is not the only plausible reading of the Florida
statutory scheme-the dissenters in the Florida Supreme Court, and
the concurring opinion, thought the canvassing boards should get
more deference-but so far as I am aware no one has identified either
a statute or a precedent that precludes the Florida Supreme Court's
view.
Beyond the substantive merits of the case, there are other indica-
tions that the Florida Supreme Court was not simply trying to ensure
that Vice President Gore would win the election. On several occasions,
the Florida Supreme Court ruled against Vice President Gore on im-
portant issues. For example, before the election results were certified,
the Florida Supreme Court rejected Vice President Gore's effort to
require Miami-Dade County to resume the recount it had started,
then stopped. The Vice President believed that the remaining votes in
that county would give him the statewide lead. It is not out of the
question -and at the time it seemed entirely possible, indeed perhaps
probable-that the Florida Supreme Court's decision on this issue
cost the Vice President the election.
Later, the Florida Supreme Court summarily affirmed lower
court decisions from Seminole and Martin Counties. In those cases,
Republican Party officials were shown to have engaged in clearly im-
proper conduct in the handling of absentee ballots. The trial courts
nonetheless denied relief, holding that the election results were not
tainted." The clear impropriety might well have provided an opening
for the Florida Supreme Court to rule in favor of the Vice President,
had it been seeking opportunities to do so. The Florida Supreme
Court also upheld a lower court decision that refused to declare the
Palm Beach County "butterfly ballot" unlawful and to order a revote3
Finally, in the contest case that led to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v Gore, the Florida Supreme Court rejected
several claims by the Vice President that were at least colorable. The
Supreme Court refused to intervene when Vice President Gore com-
plained that the trial judge -whom the Supreme Court ultimately re-
versed-was proceeding too slowly, even though it was clear that the
51 Gore v Harris, 772 S2d 1243, 1252 (Fla Dec 8,2000), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore, 121
S Ct 525.
52 Taylor v Martin County Canvassing Board, 773 S2d 517 (Fla Dec 12,2000).
53 Fladell v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 772 S2d 1240 (Fla Dec 1, 2000).
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passage of time could be fatal to the Vice President's chances' This
was a self-defeating thing for the Florida Supreme Court to do, if it
simply wanted to ensure the Vice President's election. When it heard
the case on the merits, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the Vice
President's argument that 3,300 votes from Palm Beach County that
had been manually counted should be recounted."5 The Florida Su-
preme Court also rejected the Vice President's argument that Nassau
County authorities acted improperly by refusing to certify the vote to-
tals disclosed by a mandatory machine recount, reverting instead to
the initial machine count that was more favorable to Governor Bush:'
David Boies, the Vice President's lead counsel, regarded this as such a
strong claim that he said beforehand, "If I can't win that argument,
I'm going to give up the practice of law."7
Of course, these rulings may simply have been in accordance with
the law. Certainly the fact that the Florida Supreme Court ruled
against Vice President Gore on some occasions does not establish that
its rulings in his favor were correct. But the United States Supreme
Court, I have argued, was not prompted by a reasoned judgment that
the Florida Supreme Court made specific legal errors. The United
States Supreme Court's actions seem to be the product of a general
sense that the Florida Supreme Court was illegitimately manipulating
the law to ensure that Vice President Gore won. Even if the Florida
Supreme Court was doing so, that would not by itself justify the ac-
tions of the United States Supreme Court: one of the consequences of
a federal system of government is that sometimes state authorities will
abuse their power in ways that the federal government is powerless to
correct. But the fact that the Florida Supreme Court passed up oppor-
tunities to rule in favor of Vice President Gore, even when it was plau-
sible to do so and when such a ruling would have greatly helped him,
is evidence that the United States Supreme Court's perception was
wrong.
CONCLUSION
No one, not even the most enthusiastic supporter of Governor
Bush's campaign, should feel entirely comfortable with the result in
54 Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v Harris, 772 S2d 1220,1240 (Fla Nov 21,2000),
vacd and remd as, Bush v Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 121 S Ct 471.
55 Gore v Harris, 772 S2d 1243,1259-60 (Fia Dec 8,2000), revd and remd as, Bush v Gore,
121 S Ct 525.
56 Gore v Harris, 772 S2d at 1260.
57 David Firestone and David Barstow, Counting the Vote: The Overview: Florida Legisla-
ture Plans to Enter Legal Fray, Backing Bush's Suit, NY Times Al (Nov 25, 2000).
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Bush v Gore. If I am right about what the Supreme Court did, then
the best that can be said is that the Court trumped the supposed law-
lessness of the Florida Supreme Court with lawlessness of its own. As
I have suggested, I do not believe the United States Supreme Court
had adequate reason to suspect the Florida Supreme Court of a na-
kedly partisan effort to "steal" the election. But the more troubling
question is whether, even if the justices' view of the Florida Supreme
Court was correct, they were justified in acting without really being
concerned about whether they had a sound legal basis for doing so.
Judges, like everyone else, sometimes act on instinct. That is inevi-
table and, as I said at the outset, often unobjectionable, within limits.
But a close election is sure to inflame partisan passions and to skew
judgment in a partisan direction. That makes it all the more important
for judges to hesitate, to question their own motives, and to make sure
that their judgments have a solid basis in the law before they act. That
may be a lot to expect. But if there is any court of which we should
expect it, it is the United States Supreme Court. In Bush v Gore, a ma-
jority of the Court, prompted by a general and unjustified sense that
something needed to be done, plunged in, splintered along ideological
lines, and played a prominent role in deciding the election. This was
not a triumph for the rule of law.
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